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Abstract: 
It is often argued that environmental scarcity was a trigger and source of violent conflict, in 
particular in African countries. At the root of such arguments is a simple environmental 
determinism, which understands scarcity as undermining co-operative relationships between 
competing resource users. Robert Kaplan popularised this thesis in his argument about “The 
Coming Anarchy”, where he interpreted recent civil wars in Africa as an advent of a 
fundamental environmental crisis. In our view, this conception disregards the crucial role of 
local-level institutions in governing competing resource claims. In this paper, we present a 
case study from the violence-prone Somali Region, Ethiopia. We analyse how agro-pastoralist 
communities develop sharing arrangements on pasture resources with intruding pastoralist 
communities in drought years, even though this places additional pressure on their grazing 
resource. A household survey investigates the determinants for different households in the 
agro-pastoralist community, asset-poor and wealthy ones, to enter into different types of 
sharing arrangements. Our findings suggest that resource sharing offers asset-poor households 
opportunities to stabilise and enhance their asset-base in drought years, providing incentives 
for co-operative rather than conflictive relations with intruding pastoralists. We conclude that 
it may depend on potential incentives arising from institutional arrangements, whether 
competing resource claims in periods of environmental scarcity are resolved peacefully or 
violently. 
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1 Introduction 
In the 1990s, Thomas Malthus’ (1798) demographic theory had a powerful reawakening. 
According to Malthus, war is one of the 'positive constraints' through which people and 
resources are brought back into balance after a period of population growth. Similarly, Robert 
Kaplan argued in his influential essay The Coming Anarchy (1994) that violence and war in 
African countries such as Liberia, Somalia and Rwanda were clear evidence of Africa's 
gathering environmental crisis. Culture clash, resource competition and environmental 
breakdown would provoke a rash of small, localised and essentially uncontrollable armed 
conflicts. Many of these were to be anarchic disputes, i.e. apolitical events indistinguishable 
from banditry and crime. At the heart of this “New Barbarism” hypothesis (Richards 1996) is 
the idea that young people in Africa are driven to violence by population pressure and 
ecological collapse.  
In this Malthusian line of thinking, there is an influential research tradition which 
understands resource scarcity and environmental degradation as a source and trigger of social 
conflict and war (e.g. Bächler et al. 1996; Carius and Lietzmann 1999; Homer-Dixon 1994, 
1999). Homer-Dixon (1994) has developed a theoretical framework of environmental 
scarcity, which distinguishes supply-induced scarcity (resource degradation), demand-induced 
scarcity (population growth) and structural scarcity (inequitable distribution of resources). 
Environmental scarcity caused by one or an interplay of these factors is assumed to have 
serious socio-economic consequences, which in turn trigger domestic violent conflict. These 
three categories are also reflected in the study of Braun et al. (1999) on Famine in Africa. The 
latter distinguish resource poverty - climate shocks (equivalent to supply-induced), population 
pressure (demand-induced) and the broad category of policy, institutional and organizational 
failures (structural scarcity) as explanatory variables for the persistence of famine in Africa.  
The Malthusian trap is often considered to drive environmentally-induced violence and 
resource conflicts in Africa’s Sahel zone, in particular when resource competition occurs 
between different “cultures” (pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and sedentary farmers) and ethnic 
clans (e.g. Mohammed Salih et al. 2001). In addition, the literature on common-pool resource 
(CPR) theory has emphasised that with the advent of high population pressure, increased 
market penetration and weakening traditional leadership, many traditional access and 
management regimes to common grazing land in Africa seemingly need better adapted 
regimes to cope with increased pressure on a finite natural resource base (Bromley and 
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Cernea 1989; North 1994; Lawry 1990). These scholars largely pursue the study of access 
regimes under efficiency and productivity considerations looking at which access regimes 
(private, common property etc.) were best for sustainable resource management (Place and 
Hazell 1993, Ngaido 1995; Swallow and Bromley 1995). However, even robust access 
regimes may come under challenge in periods of environmental shocks, such as drought and 
famine years. 
Arguably, whether resource scarcity and environmental stress lead to political violence 
depends on the institutions and governance structures regulating access to resources and 
social welfare in a specific society and the role of the state, the elites, national inequality and 
political exclusion, hence the functioning or failing of a state. In particular, when access to 
resources is unequally distributed and resource rents are monopolised by a small elite, this 
often creates potential for social conflict and political violence (Auty 2001; Azam 2001; 
Carment 2003; Hermann 2002; Le Billon 2001; Mazrui 1995; Wimmer 1997). Furthermore, 
we need to understand the local-level institutional arrangements, which govern resource use 
in violence-prone areas (Collinson 2003; Korf 2004, 2005). In particular in ‘territories without 
a state’, in spaces, where the state has not the capacity to institute its realm of power, local 
and regional institutions of resource governance may become even more relevant. Hence, we 
have to study the potential dynamics of the Malthusian trap as being embedded in the 
institutional context of a particular place and society. 
Our research on resource sharing arrangements between agro-pastoralist and pastoralist 
groups in Yerer and Daketa valleys located in the Ethiopian Somali region at the Horn of 
Africa brought up an empirical puzzle in contradiction to the Malthusian notion: even in an 
area which is considered to be prone to inter-clan violence, contraband trade and political 
instability at the border region between Ethiopia and Somalia, agropastoralists in Yerer and 
Daketa valleys do find peaceful arrangements with outsider pastoralists for sharing grazing 
land in times of drought, i.e. when the resources are particularly scarce. In other places of the 
area, this is not the case: in those places, there are frequent violent clashes between 
pastoralists and agropastoralists over grazing resources in times of drought. Our research 
therefore centered on the question how the peaceful institutions could emerge in our case 
when the broader spaces around this place constitute a potentially violent environment.  
In this paper, we trace socio-economic characteristics of agro-pastoralist households in 
Yerer and Daketa valleys, which determine a household’s decision to engage in sharing 
arrangements with outsider pastoralist groups, which demand access to their pasture and water 
resources in times of drought, i.e. a nature-induced shock. For a limited period of time, during 
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the peak environmental stress of a drought phase, the pastoralists’ demands would place 
further stress on the already scarce pasture resources of agro-pastoralist communities. In 
particular, we want to understand the intra-group dynamics among agro-pastoralists of these 
resource sharing arrangements: which types of households are most likely to enter into 
resource sharing agreements and what type of arrangement these are likely to be.  
The paper proceeds as follows: the following section discusses the analytical framework of 
our study, namely the concepts of entitlements, endowments and capabilities. Section 3 
provides the background to our case study in Somali Region with a special emphasis on 
institutional arrangements for sharing grazing resources. Section 4 outlines our econometric 
model and section 5 describes and discusses the results of our empirical research looking at 
the incentives of households to engage in a specific sharing arrangement. Our findings 
suggest that resource scarcity may offer opportunities for asset-poor households to gain from 
sharing agreements and to enhance, though on a limited scale, their household capabilities. 
This provides incentives for finding co-operative solutions in times of scarcity. 
2 Endowments, Entitlements and Capabilities 
It is important to specify the nature of property rights and the processes through which actors 
gain access to and can derive benefits from resources. Amarthya Sen first developed the 
entitlement concept to explain the emergence of famines in India (Sen 1981). His concern was 
to explain how individuals or households derive entitlements to food. Environmental 
entitlement scholars have expanded the concept to focus on the dynamics and institutions of 
resource governance (Leach et al. 1999). First, we have to specify what types of rights to 
resources are at stake. Devereux (1996) stresses the importance of clarifying units of analysis 
(individual, household, community, etc.). He develops a hierarchy of claims or property rights 
over a resource or commodity, ranging from influence (weakest), access, control, and 
ownership (strongest). Control refers to the right of determining use and exclusion. Access 
refers to possibilities of use. And influence is only a limited say over access and control. In 
this logic, ownership includes all influence, access and control rights.  
Crucial in entitlement analysis is the conceptual distinction between endowment as 
ownership, control or access to the resource and entitlement, which is the ownership etc. of 
the benefits and utilities derived from a resource (Devereux 1996; Gasper 1993). The question 
is who ultimately gets the effective command over making actual economic use of a resource 
and its products, which determines the economic relevance of user rights (Eggertsson 1996: 
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7). The entitlements derived from endowments in turn enhance people’s capabilities, i.e. what 
people can do with their entitlements (Leach et al. 1999). These entitlements are influenced 
by the interplay of institutions (e.g. customary rules, division of labour, power). Local 
institutions can either promote or hinder the mobilization of some endowments (e.g. social 
capital) that are necessary to make effective use of others (e.g. natural capital). We understand 
institutions as emerging sites of social interaction, negotiation and contestation, comprising 
heterogeneous actors having diverse goals. Given the ecological constraints and the variation 
of resource users over space and time, institutional arrangements for resource governance may 
be ad hoc, ambiguous and overlapping.  
Sen's entitlement approach (Sen 1981) conceptualised how individuals or households 
derive endowments and entitlements under a given legal framework. This rights-based 
approaches does not take sufficient account of structural and relational mechanisms of gaining 
access to resources (Fine 1997; Watts 1991; Watts and Bohle 1993), and neglects the politics 
of resource governance, which determine not only the rights to derive benefits, but the actual 
ability to benefit from things (Ribot and Peluso 2003). More specifically, how do agents in 
specific circumstances negotiate their rights to resources and to the benefit streams derived 
from these resources and how does this influence a household’s capability to act and be? 
While agents may have rights to use resources, this is a necessary, but not sufficient condition 
for deriving benefits from these rights and to enhance an agent’s capability. This ability to 
benefit is itself dependent on structural conditions, such as labour markets, property rights 
structures, and it is relational in the sense that these conditions are contested and can be 
renegotiated in a local or regional political and social field. It is therefore necessary to 
examine the layer of "property practices" in relation to specific items of property as well as to 
actions and processes in which all the rules and practices surrounding property are contested, 
reproduced and, possibly, transformed (Hann 2000: 8). Entitlements, then, are the outcome of 
negotiations among actors, involving power relations and debates over meaning (Gore 1993; 
Watts 1991).  
In this paper, we are particularly interested in the transition from endowments to 
entitlements to common grazing lands and how agents transform these into capabilities and 
functionings. More precisely, we study how asset-poor agropastoralist households transform 
endowments to (their right to use) grazing land into rights to concrete benefit streams arising 
from these endowment rights, their entitlements. These entitlements derive from trading 
endowment rights to outsider pastoralists in specific resource sharing arrangements where 
agropastoralists receive compensation for granting their endowments to grazing resources, 
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which they are unable to use themselves due to a lack of assets, to outsiders. We study this 
process in one particular place located in the politically unstable and violence-prone Somali 
Region in eastern Ethiopia. 
3 Contested Pasture Resources in the Yerer and Daketa Valleys 
Capitalizing on the mobility of livestock is one of the major ways in which pastoralists have 
managed ecological uncertainties and risks (Bassett 1986; Scoones 1994). Various studies are 
showing that mobile production systems in arid and semi-arid lands of Africa appear to be 
economically more efficient than sedentary systems (Scoones 1993, 1994). Since the 
productivity of the ecosystem in arid- and semi-arid areas is spatially and temporally variable 
and to a large degree unpredictable, mobility enables the adequate use of the resources 
according to its availability in time and space (Niamir-Fuller 2000). Scarcity has a dynamic 
dimension as well: we need to distinguish gradual deteriorating trends and sudden shocks, 
mostly drought-induced disaster. Such shocks often accelerate the gradual declining trend, but 
these two types need to be distinguished, because the resource users develop different coping 
and adaptive strategies to respond to these different types of environmentally induced 
challenges to their livelihoods. 
Millions of poor people in Ethiopia live in semi-arid agropastoral and pastoral areas and 
have suffered extreme marginalization and food insecurity because of reduced access to 
pastureland, and in some places steadily extending croplands (Manger and Ahmed 2000). The 
lack of public support for the pastoralists has further excluded their participation in decision 
making. In the new political and socio-economic context of post-Socialist Ethiopia, research 
focusing on the management of community-based natural resources is emerging (Birhanu, et 
al. 2002, 2003; McCarthy et al. 2002). The findings of Birhanu et al. (2002), for example, 
confirm that collective action for grazing land management is widespread in the highlands of 
northern Ethiopia and both formal and informal property right institutions govern the use and 
allocation of croplands, forestlands, and grazing lands. Other studies show the increasing 
scope for inter-clan violence in pastoralist areas (e.g. Kassa 2001).  
3.1 Background of the Study Area 
Our study area, the Yerer and Daketa valleys, is located in eastern Ethiopia at the transition 
zone from the highlands to the semi-arid lowlands. The territories are situated in the Somali 
Regional State of Ethiopia, which borders Somaliland. These areas are spaces without firm 
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government control; contraband trade is ongoing through the vast desert planes towards 
Somaliland. These areas are considered as politically unstable, prone to clan violence, 
banditry and crime. The state views the pastoralist groups moving in the outer spaces of the 
semi-arid lowlands and crossing the fuzzy boundaries between Ethiopia and Somaliland with 
suspicion, because of contraband trade, their pride, their willingness to defend their territories 
with arms and the difficulty to control the movement of these clans who largely belong to 
Somali tribes with kinship bonds to Somaliland. 
From an agro-ecological perspective, the area can be classified into two zones namely, 
woina dega (mid altitude) and kola (lowland). The valleys are characterised by sparse and 
irregular rainfall, and are highly drought-prone. Both the Dakata and the Yerer rivers are 
seasonal. They dry on the surface around the end of October. The valley bottom is fertile and 
suited for the production of many lowland agricultural products during favourable rain 
seasons. During the rainy season, there is a lush growth of grass and shrubs supporting 
thousands of livestock and wildlife. Even after a long time the rainy season is over, the grass 
continues to grow on the seasonally swampy places. In many parts of the valley, however, 
cactus weeds present a dangerous competition to the grazing grassland and contribute to 
degradation of pasture resources. 
The inhabitants of the Yerer and Daketa valleys used to follow a traditional transhumant 
pattern of pastoralism with regular movement to and away from the valley. Livestock are 
watered at the shallow wells and seasonal streams during the wet season and deep hand-dug 
wells during dry seasons. They are grazed on the densely bushed hillside during the wet 
season, but allowed to browse along the riverside and on croplands during the dry season. The 
possession of a large number of livestock has remained the ambition of agro-pastoralists in 
the area. Even in the years of good harvests, households tend to sell the surplus and buy cattle 
or goat in return. Households tend to grow crops when the rainfall conditions permit, in 
particular sorghum, maize and groundnuts. Various types of water sources are used in the 
study area, including hand dug wells, digging stream beds, ponds, hand pump and reservoirs. 
The deep hand-dug wells, locally known as ella, are of particular importance in shaping social 
organizations in Daketa valley where surface water is relatively scarce and are used during 
dry seasons to supply water both for people and livestock.  
Much of the benefits derived from the Valleys’ natural resource base are exploited by agro-
pastoral communities which represent various clans or sub-tribes including Girie-Babile, 
Malingur, Hawiya, Abiskul, Werehume, Rer-Worfa, Ugas Koshin, Rer Isahak and Mekabil. 
During the dry season, the agro-pastoralists live almost entirely on sorghum and maize. 
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During the wet season, milk is the main food, except on feast days, not much meat is 
consumed. The valleys are largely used for grazing by the Oromo and the Somali lowlanders. 
Occasionally, in time of severe drought and grass shortage, the Issas also bring their herds of 
cattle and graze. The highland residents may also come from the plateau surrounding the 
valley; they usually have settled communities and at one time or another have tried to grow 
sorghum and corn further down the valley but abandoned these fields because of forest birds 
and wild animals. Besides grazing, these people also derive economic benefit from the valley 
by selling on the roadside fuelwood and charcoal to people travelling between Harar and 
Jijiga towns. Because of occasional violent armed clashes in the past between clans or sub-
tribal groupings, each group or community is supposed to graze at a given space of the valley 
at a certain season of the year. It is not uncommon to see in one place armed herdsmen among 
their livestock; and when one group tries to encroach on the territorial confines of another, 
fighting may break out resulting in the loss of life and the abduction of the enemy’s livestock. 
The prolonged dry seasons of the 1980s and 1990s observed a mass movement of the 
pastoralists of the Somali Regional State towards the Yerer and Daketa valleys which are 
normally agropastoralist territories. In most instances the pastoralists return to their 
transhumance system, very few have been able to settle by converting into agro-pastoralists.   
3.2 Local Institutions and Access Regimes to Pasture Resources 
Agropastoralists in Daketa and Yerer valleys are largely governed by the customary land 
tenure system where land nominally belongs to the state but the council of the peasant 
association, in collaboration with concerned government offices, allocates cultivation rights to 
individual households, while pasture land remains under the management and control of the 
community. The seasonal movement has changed gradually and crop cultivation in the fertile 
valley bottom has evolved and crop-livestock interaction increased. In the last fifty years, land 
tenure and land use systems were transformed from largely pastoralists exploiting communal 
rangelands to settled agro-pastoralists utilizing privately owned croplands and communally 
owned grazing lands (Tilahun et al. 1996). Some individual households gained more 
exclusive use right by investing their labour into the development or maintenance of water 
points. As a result, one can observe a mix of private, common, and state property and 
sometimes open access resources as mediated by a complex body of rules established by local 
groups-rules established over time. The definition of these rules, their supervision and 
adjustment depend on local organizations acting under the authority of traditional institutions. 
In terms of social status, the village leader (aba genda) is the most powerful personality in the 
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community. These traditional leaders become more influential as the state has only weak 
enforcement power in these outskirts of the state’s territories.  
Even though the incumbent agro-pastoral communities have long considered the Yerer and 
Daketa valleys as theirs, other pastoral groups from semi-arid areas of the Somali Regional 
State also access the common grazing lands, particularly during drought years. The growing 
number of migrant pastoralists and their large number of cattle exercise an increasing pressure 
upon grazing land, particularly during times when it is ecologically fragile.  The variability of 
boundaries between grazing and cultivated lands always required the mediation of traditional 
institutions in granting access to different users. In drought periods, community leaders of 
pastoralist communities seeking refuge in the more fertile lands of Yerer and Daketa Valley 
enter into negotiations with community leaders of the agro-pastoralist communities with 
customary endowments to pasture resources.  
This negotiation process between pastoralists and agro-pastoralists comes in two stages. In 
drought years, pastoralist community leaders will first negotiate conditions for sharing pasture 
resources in the more fertile Yerer and Daketa valley with community leaders of the agro-
pastoralists. When a general agreement on the level of the community leaders is found, 
pastoralist households will move towards the territories of the agro-pastoralists and seek 
sharing agreements with specific agro-pastoralist households in exchange of receiving 
entitlements to the grazing resources. In this sense, endowments (access rights) of agro-
pastoralist community members are traded against direct benefits from pastoralist’s 
entitlements to grazing land gained through these agreements. Poorer community members 
may be negatively affected in the process because land encroachment prevents them from 
directly accessing common resources, and precludes them from extracting wood for charcoal 
making and fuel wood for sale. Therefore, they tend to engage in negotiations with wealthier 
pastoralist from nearby semi-arid areas to facilitate mobility and encroachment. The 
incentives for engaging in sharing arrangements is particularly high for asset-poor 
households, since sharing allows them to trade endowments to grazing resources, which they 
were unable to use before due to lack of livestock assets, against benefit streams which they 
derive from a share of the pastoralists’ animal resources for the latter’s right to grazing in the 
land. The payoffs of such negotiations are very important starting points for asset building. 
These community members are, therefore, more likely to contract with outsiders in order to 
support their families as well as foster capabilities.  
Our household survey (Section 4 and 5) therefore focuses on the incentives of agro-
pastoralist households to engage in sharing agreements with pastoralist households. The 
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incentives for households to share grazing endowments with pastoralists and the types of 
household-to-household sharing arrangement will also have repercussions on the prior 
negotiations on community leader level, because agro-pastoralist leaders need to account of 
the interests of their community members. 
4 Methodology 
4.1 Survey Design and Data Collection 
The data collection was divided in two phases. The first phase aimed at identifying major 
issues in the management of grazing land and other resources in the study area through 
literature review, examination of secondary data, and informal exploratory surveys. Informal 
surveys were particularly useful because reliable prior studies on collective action and 
property rights were not available or incomplete or out of date. The second stage comprised a 
comprehensive household survey to analyse household’s decisions to engage in specific 
institutional arrangements for sharing grazing resources. 
In the extensive survey, all the five peasant associations, i.e., three in Daketa valley and 2 
in Yerer valley, were covered and semi-structured group interview with community 
representatives was conducted. This was supplemented by information acquired from key 
informants. Selection of appropriate communities for intensive household survey was based 
on the intermediate results of the extensive survey. One criterion was to ensure representation 
of communities with contrasting characteristics in terms of wealth. The sample size 
considered the complexity of the issue and accuracy and coverage of data necessary for the 
statistical analysis to be used. During the extensive survey we learned that the three peasant 
associations located in Daketa valley have a total member of 2315 households, whereas the 
two peasant associations located in Yerer valley have a total member of 1928 households. A 
total of 150 households (80 households from Daketa valley and 70 households from Yerer 
valley) were covered during the intensive survey, but only 146 responses were complete to be 
used for further analysis. The households were selected randomly proportionate to size from a 
complete list of members of the peasant associations. A structured questionnaire was designed 
and pre-tested before executing the intensive household survey. Data collected include family 
composition, inventory of assets, history of acquisition of assets, current production and non-
labour input use, property rights, history of institutional arrangement with pastoralist, among 
others.  
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4.2 Framework for Econometric Analysis 
This paper attempts to scrutinise major socio-economic and demographic characteristics of 
sample households that influence the households’ choice of institutional arrangements to 
facilitate mobility of pastoralists for the use of common grazing lands for mutual benefit. We 
assume that agropastoralist households will accommodate pastoralists on their common 
grazing land only if the private benefits from accommodating the pastoralists exceed the costs 
they are supposed to incur, i.e. the net benefit (NB) is positive. Among the various private 
benefits are gains from sharing calves, using milk, drought power, and potential 
improvements in asset endowment. In addition, accommodating pastoralists may provide 
additional utility obtained from non-market benefits resulting from reciprocal arrangements. 
On the other hand, accommodation costs include not only part or all of the social cost of 
alienation from the wealthier agropastoralists, but also the negotiation and transaction time 
needed to learn about the incoming pastoralists.  
The net benefits (NBj) derived from the j-th alternative institutional arrangement can be 
decomposed into a systematic and random component. That is, net benefit is the sum of 
observable and unobservable components, 
NBij (choice j for household i) =  Vij +εij 
The net benefit level NBij, which is household i’s net benefit from choosing alternative j, is 
determined by the systematic component of net benefit of Vij and random components, εij, 
which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (Greene, 2003). The random 
component represents the unknown components of the households’ net benefit function, 
which can also be represented by a linear function of a vector  of attributes which characterise 
the i-th household, Xi: i.e., 
NBj = Xiβj + εj    Where εj∼ N(0, σ2) and j = 0, 1, …, J. (1)  
Where βj represents parameters to be estimated and εj the disturbance term. The disturbance 
terms are assumed to be independently and identically distributed.  
The agropastoralist i chooses institutional arrangement j, if: 
NBij  > NBik,      for all k ≠ j. (2) 
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where NBij is the net benefit to the i-th household of alterative j, and   NBik is the net benefit 
of alternative k to i-th household. If each institutional arrangement is considered as a possible 
net benefit maximization decision by the agropastoralist, the decision maker is expected to 
choose that alternative which will maximise the present value of net benefit. Therefore, given 
a finite set of alternatives to select among, the decision of the i-th household can be modelled 
as maximizing the present value of streams of net benefits by picking the j-th alternative from 
among the J discrete choices available such that: 
Max J  {E(NBij) = ƒj (Xi ) + εj,      for  j = 1, 2,…, J.} 
Where ƒj is a function of Xi  = (Xi1,…, Xin ), which is a (1 x n) vector of attributes  of the i-th 
household that are expected to potentially affect the desirability of an alternative. 
The probability that household i chooses alternative j is equal to the probability that the net 
benefit of alterative j is greater than the net benefits of all other alternative choices set. That 
is, 
Pr(NBij = j) = Pr (NBij > NBik)  ∀  j ≠ k (3) 
In the study area, we can distinguish among three major categories of institutional 
arrangements that agropastoralists seek for practice in managing accommodation and 
facilitate the mobility of the pastoralists: (1) reciprocity, (2) sharing calves, and (3) the right to 
use milk. Given the multinomial nature of these institutional arrangements, a nominal logit 
econometric technique can be used in the empirical investigation of the factors associated 
with the decision to accommodate pastoralists.  
Therefore, a multinomial logit model from Greene (2003) was used for the analysis. Since 
NBij is latent, it is not observable. Therefore, let Yij be the indicator variable, so that: 
∑
=
== J
k
ij
ij
ij
X
X
jYP
1
)exp(
)exp(
)(
β
β
 (4) 
where Pr(.) is the probability that the i-th household prefers and practices the j-th arrangement 
(j = 0, 1,…, J). Respondents are asked whether they have hosted pastoralist during the last 
five years and if yes which institutional arrangement they practiced and preferred most. Then 
the model is estimated with four alternatives, namely: j=0 if the respondent indicated s/he did 
not host any pastoralist or did not have any opinion regarding the best arrangement; j=1 if the 
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respondent indicated s/he has hosted pastoralist on reciprocity. That is, the head of household 
recognises that agropastoralists livelihoods are also subject to ecological uncertainty and 
therefore they can be faced with adverse conditions forcing them to migrate to areas normally 
inhabited by pastoralist. In this case, these communities will accommodate them in response 
to their good treatment in adverse conditions. j=2 if the respondent indicated s/he has hosted 
pastoralists in exchange for sharing the new born animals within the herd during the entire 
stay of the pastoralist with the agropastoralists household. That is, if the herd gave for six 
young animals (calves), then the agropastoralists is entitled to take three. j=3 if the respondent 
indicated s/he used the milk from the herd during its stay. The first arrangement, j=0, which is 
that the respondent indicated s/he did not host any pastoralist, is used as the reference choice. 
Xi represents a vector of demographic, economic and spatial characteristics for the observed 
individual households. βjs are a vector of estimated parameters.  
Normalization of the alternatives by one of the categories (βk = 0) yields the multinomial 
logit model as: 
∑
=
+
== J
k
ij
ij
ij
X
X
jYP
1
)exp(1
)exp(
)(
β
β
  for j = 1, 2,…, J. (5) 
The probability of omitted (j-th) alternative can be derived from the formula: 
∑
=
+
== J
k
ij
ij
X
jYP
1
)exp(1
1)(
β
 (6) 
Since the coefficients of such models are not directly interpreted in contrast to OLS results, 
marginal effects were estimated to express the probability of change alternative arrangement 
in accommodating pastoralists with respect to each independent variable, measured from the 
mean of the variable. The marginal effect can be expressed as: 
∑
=
−=∂
∂ J
k
ijjxijjx
ij
ij PP
X
P
1
)( ββ    for j = 0, 1,…, J. (7) 
where βjx is the coefficient of X for alternative j. The marginal effect on the redundant 
category is obvious as the sum of the marginal effects of all alternatives equal to zero. The 
data are analyzed employing LimDep version 7.0 econometric software. Moreover, 
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descriptive analysis will be used to provide detailed description of the rules and institutions 
that govern resource entitlement, use and system performance.  
5 Results and Discussion 
5.1 Descriptive Characteristics of the Sample Households 
Household demographic profile of the 146 respondents surveyed indicates that the average 
number of persons per household was 6.93 in Daketa valley and 6.30 in Yerer valley with an 
overall average of 6.70. The adult female members of the household, who constitute on 
average 24%, shoulder great pressure and responsibility in the household affairs of the 
community we surveyed. Their responsibility include, among other things, cooking, gathering 
firewood, caring for children and the elderly. They are also responsible for caring for sheep 
and goats, the breeding stock, including milking cows and young animals, as well as for 
marketing animal products, particularly milk.  Fetching water for human consumption, among 
other responsibilities of women, was raised as the most time consuming and labour 
demanding task. Not only does the distance to water sources increase during dry seasons, but 
the water level in the wells also drops thus making the task even more difficult for women.  
The respondents were also asked in the household survey: “How wealthy do you consider 
yourself?” and the answers were coded 1, lower than most; 2, same as most; and 3, higher 
than most. Even though such a subjective measure of poverty is advantageous in terms of 
simplicity for collecting information, the response may be influenced by considerations that 
do not reflect the actual welfare of the household. Particularly, some household-heads may be 
unwilling to admit that they are poor as it may imply low status in the community. Whereas, 
others may claim that they are poor if they anticipate that the survey results will bring them 
some assistance. Table 1 shows the frequency distribution for the two locations under 
consideration. 
Proportionately more households (33.7%) in Daketa valley consider themselves less 
wealthy than other members of the community, whereas the corresponding value for Yerer 
valley is 16.7%. 
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Table 1:  Frequency distribution for personal wealth ranking (% of respondents) 
Location (COMM)  
Personal wealth 
ranking 
Daketa 
(n = 92) 
Yerer 
(n = 54) 
 
Overall sample 
(n = 146) 
Lower than most 33.7 16.7 27.4 
Same as most 50.0 72.2 58.2 
Higher than most 16.3 11.1 14.4 
For agropastoralist societies in the study area livestock and livestock products are the main 
source of livelihoods. Therefore, data was gathered on livestock ownership of each 
respondent household. The results reveal that agro-pastoralist households in the study area 
had an average of 11.79 Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) per household. Agro-pastoralist in 
Daketa valley own relatively larger herds, and this is also statistically significant (P < 0.01). 
The results also show that cattle (cow, ox/bull, and young animals) constitute large proportion 
of the livestock population. The cattle herd was also female dominated with a cow to ox/bull 
ratio of 6.01:1, 4.5:1 and 5.64:1 for Daketa valley and Yerer valley, and the whole 
respondents, respectively. A more female-dominated herd structure is of course a common 
feature of pastoralist communities.  
With an average of 9.41 animals per household, Daketa agro-pastoralists had the larger 
herd of small ruminants. Small ruminants are valuable assets to the households particularly in 
terms of their contribution to food security, especially during the onset of drought. It is this 
category of the livestock that households prefer to dispose off in order to get food in 
exchange. They are also considered to contribute towards “efficient” utilization of household 
labour as they employ young children’s labour that would have remained idle otherwise. 
Agropastoralists in Daketa and Yerer valleys consider water as perhaps the most fundamental 
resource because trekking of livestock to water sources is among the major duties for the 
members of the community. The information obtained through the household survey revealed 
that on average households trek their livestock for 2.97 kilometers during dry season and 0.94 
kilometers during wet season to watering points.   
In times of drought, an agreement between the community leaders of agropastoralists and 
pastoralists will enable the pastoralists to move towards the territories of the agro-pastoralists 
and seek sharing arrangement with specific agro-pastoralist households in exchange of 
receiving entitlements to the grazing resources. Depending on household wealth and asset 
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endowments of agro-pastoralist households, these sharing arrangements on household-to-
household level take different forms. Table 2 shows that 87.6 percent of households who 
consider themselves “lower than most” in terms of personal wealth accommodated 
pastoralists in return for either the right to use milk or sharing calves, whereas 57.10 percent 
of the wealthier groups looked for reciprocal arrangement. This illustrates that asset-poor 
households can use such sharing arrangements to translate their endowments to grazing land 
in concrete benefits and asset transfers, while the wealthier households invest more in long-
term reciprocal obligations rather than asking for immediate asset transfers. 
Table 2:  Percentage of respondents who hosted pastoralists by wealth and 
institutional arrangement 
Institutional arrangement  
Personal wealth 
ranking (PWR) 
Not practiced 
(n = 21) 
Reciprocal
(n = 44) 
Share calves 
(n = 44) 
 Use milk 
(n = 37) 
 
Total 
(n = 146) 
Lower than most 3.42 --- 13.7 10.3 27.4 
Same as most 10.96 21.92 13.02 12.3 58.2 
Higher than most --- 8.22 3.42 2.74 14.4 
Total  14.38 30.14 30.14 25.34 100.0 
The results of the survey reveal that the poorer a household is, the more it is involved in an 
arrangement that enables it to share calves. All community members who accommodate 
pastoralists in exchange for sharing calves own an average of 10.67 TLU per household. The 
possibility of poor agro-pastoralists engaging in hosting pastoralists has persuaded the 
relatively wealthier community members to call for mutual arrangements with the poorer 
members to exclude potential entrants, thereby benefiting from reduced overstocking on 
common rangeland. Failure to reach an agreement, however, may result in disputes. 
The reciprocal arrangement is found to be largely a risk-management strategy by relatively 
wealthier community members. Wealthier members of the agro-pastoral communities 
accommodate pastoralists and extend their resources particularly the rangelands and water 
points for the major reason that they expect the same treatment from pastoralists in case 
members of the agro-pastoral communities face drought and are forced to migrate to areas 
under the control of pastoralists. The survey results reveal that those respondents who hosted 
pastoralists based on reciprocity arrangements had an average of 17.06 TLU per household. 
The existence of such reciprocal arrangement has been crucial for sustaining agro-pastoral 
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and pastoral communities in their production systems. Reciprocity also plays an important 
role in enhancing livelihoods of the pastoral and agro-pastoral communities by extending 
resource availability through institutional arrangements between community members and 
others, and so creating greater security. 
A summary of the descriptive statistics of the study variables is given in Table 3. The 
results indicate that those households who have not practiced any institutional arrangement 
are characterised by the longest distance from the road and watering point, on average. 
Whereas households who practiced reciprocal arrangement are characterised by the least 
distance to the office of a development agent, the largest number of livestock holding in terms 
of tropical livestock unit and longest distance to primary grazing lands. The longest average 
distance to town (3.73) is reported by those households who are engaged in sharing calves. It 
is also evident from the results that households who practiced using milk are more aged, have 
the highest average number of children per household (1.97), more than average dependency 
ratio1 (1.50), the least holding in terms of tropical livestock unit and number of cows per 
household.   
Care must be taken when describing the values in the discrete variables section of Table 3. 
We will try here to explain some. Consider the raw referring to the sex of household head. 
The descriptive statistics results showed that 89 percent of the household heads are male. 
When we look into the gender composition of households who practiced the various 
institutional arrangements we find that female headed households constitute 5, 7, 11 and 19 
percent of households who preferred not to engage in any arrangement, reciprocal, sharing 
calves and the use of milk, respectively. Further disaggregating of results showed that 43.75 
and 31.25 percent of female headed households preferred for using milk and sharing calves, 
respectively, whereas 31.54 and 30 percent of male headed households practiced reciprocal 
and sharing calves, respectively.  
                                                 
1  Dependency ratio is the ratio of the number of household members younger than 15 years and older than 64 
years old to the number of household members between 15 and 64 years old. 
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Table 3: Mean and standard deviation of major attributes by practiced institutional 
arrangement  
Institutional arrangement 
Overall 
(N = 146) 
Not practiced2 
(N = 21) 
Reciprocal 
(N = 44) 
Share calves 
(N = 44) 
Use milk 
(N = 37) 
Attributes Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Age of household head 
(HAGE) 39.66 13.21 39.95 14.95 38.41 13.47 39.30 12.03 41.43 13.57 
Children less than 6 years 
old (CLD6) 1.73 1.42 1.29 1.31 1.59 1.53 1.86 1.41 1.97 1.32 
No. of adults (ADLT) 3.16 1.78 3.00 1.41 3.14 1.34 2.91 1.25 3.59 2.70 
Household size (HHS) 6.70 3.15 5.62 3.26 6.61 2.88 6.45 2.61 7.70 3.78 
Adult equivalent unit (AEU) 5.42 2.62 4.60 2.68 5.35 2.36 5.21 2.06 6.23 3.27 
Dependency ratio (DEP) 1.28 0.91 0.84 0.87 1.23 0.83 1.35 0.91 1.50 0.95 
Dist. to road (DistRD)3 1.02 0.69 1.28 0.94 0.90 0.63 0.96 0.60 1.10 0.67 
Dist. to town (DistTWN) 2.94 2.63 2.48 1.05 2.31 0.67 3.73 3.69 3.01 2.99 
Distance to development 
agent (DistEXTN) 0.66 0.52 0.47 0.47 0.75 0.52 0.62 0.47 0.72 0.59 
Tropical livestock (TLU) 11.80 11.10 9.25 5.88 17.06 12.19 10.67 11.19 8.34 9.92 
No. of cows (COW) 5.47 4.86 4.24 2.68 7.75 5.20 5.11 5.17 3.89 4.10 
No. of oxen owned (OX) 0.97 1.19 0.62 0.74 1.61 1.40 0.77 1.05 0.65 0.98 
Distance to watering point 
(DistWTR) 2.97 1.07 3.05 1.08 3.00 0.92 2.93 1.10 2.96 1.22 
Distance to grazing land 
(DistGRZ) 2.05 3.71 1.25 1.61 3.05 4.83 1.93 3.26 1.44 3.38 
           
     Discrete variables Percent of households who responded “yes” 
Household head is male (HSEX=1) 89  95  93  89  81 
Use hand dug wells  70  86  66  59  78 
Use stream bed  76  81  68  77  81 
Use pond  10  10  11  2  19 
Use hand pump  26  29  34  27  14 
Use reservoir  8  14  00  2  19 
Those households who did not host pastoralists most frequently use (i.e., 86% of them) hand 
dug well as the main source of water for their livestock, followed by those who practiced 
                                                 
2  “Not practiced” implies that the respondent indicated s/he did not host any pastoralist or do not have any 
opinion regarding the best institutional arrangement 
3  Distance is measured by kilometers required to walk to the respective destination.  
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using milk (78%). Of the 21 households who responded as they have not practiced any form 
of institutional arrangement 17 (81%) used stream beds as their primary source of water 
during the dry season, whereas the corresponding proportion was found to be 68, 77 and 81 
percent for those who practiced reciprocal, sharing calves and using milk to host the 
pastoralists.  
5.2 Determinants for Institutional Arrangement 
The multinomial logit analysis was performed using the LimDep 7.0 Discrete choice logit 
procedure. Before estimating the models, it was necessary to check if multicollinearity exists 
among the explanatory variables. The reason for this is that, if multicollinearity turns out to be 
significant, the simultaneous presence of the two variables will reinforce the individual effects 
of these variables. According to Gujarati (1995) there are various indicators of 
multicollinearity and no single diagnostic will give us a complete handle over the collinearity 
problem. For this particular study Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was used to test the 
existence of multicollinearity among continuous explanatory variables. Generally, the larger 
the value of VIFi, the more troublesome is the problem. As a rule of thumb, if the VIF of a 
variable exceeds 10 that variable is said to be highly collinear (Gujarati, 1995). In our model, 
however, the results indicate that problem of multicollinearity was not serious among 
variables to deter the inclusion of any one of the continuous variables in the model. 
Table 4 reports the results for estimation, marginal effects and standard error of each of the 
variables in each of the jointly determined models. The model chi-squared statistic (111.38 
with 36 degrees of freedom) is significant at the 1% level of probability. In addition, the 
predicted shares for each institutional arrangement are relatively consistent with the actual 
shares (Please, see the last three rows of Table 4). For all arrangements, there are three to five 
observable characteristics of household under consideration that provide statistically 
significant predictive power for practicing a given arrangement.  
The model was determined as systems of equations in which equations for various 
institutional arrangements among the pastoral and agropastoral community members were 
jointly determined using iterated seemingly unrelated regression. The parameter coefficients 
of such models are difficult to interpret directly. Instead the marginal effects are the only 
means to effectively interpret the effect of explanatory variables on the distribution of 
proportion of dependent variables. Marginal effects are the probability of change in favour of 
a specific arrangement with respect to each independent variable, measured from the mean of 
that variable. A positive or negative sign of marginal effects, the only reliable indicator in 
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such models, indicates an increase or decrease in the probability of engaging in the 
arrangement under consideration.  
There are some statistically significant variables that provide predictive information on the 
engagement of households in institutional arrangement. Overall, variables including the sex of 
household head, dependency ratio and personal wealth ranking provide the most predictive 
power as to whether or not the household engages in reciprocal arrangement, whereas number 
of household members, distance from home to the nearest market centre and personal wealth 
ranking were found to be more relevant in determining to engage sharing calves. On the other 
hand, sex of household head, number of household members, distance to watering point and 
distance to primary grazing land were found to be statistically significant in determining the 
likelihood that a household engage in the use of milk.  
While the marginal effect of sex of household in reciprocal arrangement was positive and 
statistically significant, it was negative for both sharing calves and using milk, though the 
former is not statistically significant, while the latter is statistically significant. More 
specifically, if a household is headed by a man, it is 30.2 percent more likely that it will 
engage in reciprocal arrangement and 27.9 percent less likely to engage in using milk. If a 
household size increases by one person, the household is 9.2 percent more likely to engage in 
using milk and 6.8 percent less likely to share calves. While the remaining coefficient on the 
household size is not statistically significant, it indicates that a household is 1.6 percent less 
likely to practice reciprocal arrangement. The marginal effect for dependency ratio, however, 
indicates that if dependency ratio increases, a household is 21.9 percent more likely to engage 
in reciprocal arrangement. The expectation was that an increase in dependency ratio implies 
addition of more children as household members which largely depend on milk for their daily 
nutrition. 
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Table 4:  Multinomial logit model predicting institutional arrangement, marginal 
effects, and standard errors in parentheses. 
Reciprocal Share calves Right to use milk 
Variable Coeff. 
Marginal 
effect Coeff. 
Marginal 
effect Coeff. 
Marginal 
effect 
Constant -7.18 -0.802 -2.235 0.830 -5.268 -0.258 
  (0.4504)  (0.459)  (0.380) 
COMM 1.13 -0.035 1.508 0.100 1.267 0.002 
  (0.1760)  (0.183)  (0.161) 
HSEX 0.44 0.302 -0.781 -0.056 -1.690 -0.279 
  (0.1761)*  (0.198)  (0.144)** 
HAGE -0.07 -0.004 -0.038 0.008 -0.081 -0.007 
   (0.0061)  (0.006)   (0.0053) 
HHS 0.09 -0.016 -0.024 -0.068 0.492 0.092 
  (0.0304)  (0.033)**   (0.027)*** 
DEP 2.47 0.219 1.337 -0.141 1.733 0.012 
   (0.1124)**   (0.118)   (0.0951) 
DistRD -2.03 -0.054 -2.006 -0.068 -1.748 0.024 
   (0.1242)   (0.1038)   (0.085) 
DistTWN 1.36 -0.048 1.794 0.107 1.611 0.022 
   (0.0562)   (0.04)***   (0.029) 
DistEXTN 1.88 0.128 1.185 -0.094 1.577 0.042 
   (0.1369)  (0.155)  (0.139) 
PWR 1.19 0.491 -2.077 -0.607 -0.246 0.085 
  (0.183)***   (0.18)***  (0.145) 
TLU -0.13 0.007 -0.197 -0.017 -0.147 0.002 
  (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
DistWTR 0.56 -0.013 0.439 -0.068 1.036 0.114 
  (0.060)  0.0634  (0.054)** 
DistGRZ 0.004 0.015 -0.022 0.011 -0.156 -0.028 
  (0.014)  0.0187  (0.016)* 
Predicted (%) 35.62 27.40 21.92 
Actual (%) 30.14 30.14 25.34 
χ2  statistic       =   111.38                     df     =   36                         Prob>χ2     0.000 
*, **, and *** represent 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels of statistical significance, respectively. 
Note: redundant category is “not practiced” any institutional arrangement. 
Hence, other things being equal, an increase in dependency ratio would have a positive and 
significant effect on using milk. Even though the sign of the marginal effect for dependency 
ratio is positive as expected, it is not statistically significant. An explanation for this may be 
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sought in terms of the consumption pattern of the pastoral and agropastoral communities. In 
such communities, animal products particularly milk constitute an important component in the 
daily consumption. Therefore, what matters is the household size as it determines the 
aggregate demand for milk as compared to the share of children which is relatively low.  
A household nearer to the market centre is 10.7 percent more likely to share calves, but 4.8 
percent less likely and 2.2 percent more likely to engage in reciprocal and using milk, even 
though the marginal effects are not statistically significant.  
The order in which the household head places his personal wealth against other members 
of the community has also relatively strong predictive power regarding the probability of 
engaging in a certain institutional arrangement. The positive and statistically significant 
estimated marginal effect for whether or not the household consider itself better than most, 
average and lower than most supports the study’s theoretical expectations that if a household 
is better off it will prefer reciprocal arrangement. Households who consider themselves better 
off in terms of wealth are 49.1 percent more likely to engage in reciprocal arrangement and 
60.7 percent less likely to engage in sharing calves. They are also 8.5 percent more likely to 
engage in sharing milk, but this is not statistically significant. The statistically significant 
results indicate that there is sufficient evidence to believe that wealthier households are more 
likely to engage in reciprocal arrangement and less likely in sharing calves, implying that the 
poor should seek the other way round. Meaning, the poorer a household is, the less likely that 
it prefers reciprocal arrangement and the more likely it will engage in sharing calves. 
5.3 Entitlements, Capabilities and Peaceful Co-existence 
Some research has cautioned against assuming that common property regimes guarantee 
equitable distribution of benefits (Agrawal and Gibson, 1997). Our finding is that in the case 
of the Daketa and Yerer valleys of Ethiopia, such institutional arrangements enhance the 
capability of asset-poor community members to make the most from the common grazing 
land. Times of resource scarcity may actually offer asset-poor households opportunities to 
stabilise or even expand their asset base. This paper has tried to elucidate the linkages 
between status of wealth and engaging in strategic choice to facilitate herd mobility of 
pastoralists. The results indicate that poor members of the agro-pastoral community transform 
their endowments (right of access and use) of common grazing land and social assets to actual 
entitlements of economic value of livestock through institutional arrangements. This process 
takes place because sharing arrangements with pastoralists allows these households to activate 
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dormant (not utilised) endowments to common grazing land and translate them into concrete 
entitlements and capabilities.  
Our analysis suggests that sharing arrangements between agro-pastoralist and pastoralist 
households have important distributional implications within the agro-pastoralist community: 
Asset-poor households of the agro-pastoralist community may engage themselves in mutual 
arrangements with outside pastoralists making use of their information, social assets and their 
access rights to common grazing land by virtue of their membership to the incumbent 
community. These asset-poor members exchange their social assets as being part of the agro-
pastoralist community which grants them with access rights (endowments) to grazing pasture. 
In this arrangement, they can transform their endowments to grazing land into concrete 
entitlements (benefit streams), and gain a share in the additional utility that the outsider 
pastoralists gain from being allowed to graze livestock on this pasture. This enhances the 
capabilities of asset-poor agro-pastoralists. Their concern is a short-term asset transfer to 
stabilise or enhance their material asset basis.  
Wealthier households, instead, tend to engage rather in reciprocal arrangements, which 
tend to establish social and political assets, ties which the households may rely upon in times 
of particular scarcity or economic stress. These ties may also be important to stabilise 
relationships and to foster peaceful co-existence in times of gradually increasing resource 
scarcity. However, when natural disaster provides economic shocks throughout a region, 
those social assets based on reciprocal relations may not be transferable into material assets at 
times of extreme scarcity, because pastoralist households will similarly suffer distress and 
thus be unable to reciprocate. Thus, those reciprocal relationships may be more important as 
political assets for stabilizing the overall conditions of the territories and for securing peaceful 
co-existence. In other words, while asset-poor households may derive tangible benefits from 
sharing arrangements, those benefits may be less tangible in the case of reciprocity 
arrangements sought after by wealthier households. 
6 Conclusions 
Kaplan’s “Coming Anarchy” and the simplistic scarcity = conflict causality inherent in it and 
in some literature on environment and conflict need not necessarily be the template for 
African common-pool resources. Our case study from Somali Region in Ethiopia indicates 
that supply-induced scarcity or demand-induced scarcity alone cannot properly explain 
whether violent struggles between competing resource users does or does not occur. We have 
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argued that, instead, we have to understand the local-level institutions of resource governance. 
In fact, McCarthy et al. (2002) conclude from a study on pasture management in the Borana 
plateau in southern Ethiopia that “one of the key elements in fostering co-operation will be 
methods for handling the increased heterogeneity among community members and in more 
effectively managing the communities’ relationship with outsiders who use community 
pastures” (p. 24, own emphasis).  
We have analyzed a case study where resource users from different communities find 
peaceful sharing arrangements for the use of pasture land in periods of scarcity. The Daketa 
and Yerer valleys with their relatively better quality rangelands and availability of water 
points create good conditions for grazing during dry seasons, which, in turn, attract a number 
of pastoralists, thereby necessitating the creation of institutional arrangements to get access. 
Note, that these territories were located in an area, which is known for inter-clan violence, 
contraband trade and the absence of state power, hence the seeming conditions for Kaplan’s 
anarchy. 
The research used household survey data in Daketa and Yerer valleys in eastern Ethiopia, 
and employed descriptive statistics and multinomial logit model to predict household’s 
decision to engage in a specified sharing arrangement based on observable demographic and 
socio-economic factors. The results of the multinomial logit model revealed a set of important 
factors that determine household’s decision for specific institutional arrangement. Those 
statistically significant variables that provide predictive information on whether or not the 
household engages in reciprocal arrangement include the sex of household head, dependency 
ratio and personal wealth ranking. Whereas, number of household members, distance from 
home to the nearest market centre and personal wealth ranking were found to be more 
relevant in determining to engage sharing calves. On the other hand, sex of household head, 
number of household members, distance to watering point and distance to primary grazing 
land were found to be statistically significant in determining the likelihood that a household 
engage in the use of milk.  
Endowments to common grazing land are exchanged to pastoralists for being able to utilise 
an agreed share of the pastoralist’s livestock resources. These sharing arrangements were 
particularly attractive for asset-poor households of the receiving agro-pastoralist community. 
Such institutional arrangements can reduce the vulnerability of poor community members 
who traditionally depend on common pool resources. They take advantage of the stock of 
goodwill and social networks among community members (i.e., social capital) to facilitate 
access for the pastoralists that enables poor community members to build livestock asset. 
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Hence, supply-induced resource scarcity does not necessarily need to make asset-poor 
households more vulnerable.  
Arguably, since asset-poor households gain from mutual arrangements with outsider 
pastoralists, their incentives to fight against outsider intruders may be diminished. These 
sharing arrangements may change the incentive structures within the agro-pastoralist 
communities: in particular asset-poor households have an interest to enter into sharing 
arrangements, because this can stabilise or even enhance their asset-base. Their incentives to 
fight against pastoralist intruders are therefore diminished. This may put pressure on agro-
pastoralist community leaders to negotiate peaceful resource access arrangements with the 
pastoralist community leaders. Such mutual agreements then enable pastoralists to enter the 
grazing resources without violent struggles with the agro-pastoralist community. A full 
understanding of the implications of these intra-group dynamics requires more careful study, 
though. 
Cooperation and institutional arrangement constitute forms of social assets through which 
members can generate and acquire assets that would be difficult or impossible for them to 
obtain in isolation, or without this particular legacy. There are considerable incentives for 
sharing regimes even in times of scarcity, which may prevent violent struggles to emerge 
between competing resource users. The Malthusian trap can be mediated if local-level 
institutions and economic incentives are favourable. At the same time, scarcity may increase 
to a level where such sharing arrangements as observed in Yerer and Daketa Valley, may fail 
to come into effect, because no suitable institutional arrangement can be found to allow 
adequate sharing of pasture resources. The functioning of sharing arrangements depends on 
the availability of “dormant” (= under-utilised) endowments to commons resources among 
some members of the agropastoralist communities. Scarcity beyond specific limits may still 
lead to violence. Therefore, we would like to argue that instead of developing simple causal 
determinisms between scarcity and violence, we need to better understand the institutional 
context why scarcity-induced violence may emerge in some and does not in other places. 
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